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Introduction: concepts of development,
learning, and acquisition1
KATRIN LINDNER AND ANNETTE HOHENBERGER
‘Learning’, in a very broad sense of cognitive psychology, is defined as ‘‘a
relatively permanent change in an organism’s potential for responding
that results from prior experience or practice’’ (Gordon 1989: 6). This
special issue will deal with learning in a more narrow sense, with learning
in human beings and, more specifically, with language learning.
Due to its association with early behaviorism, ‘language learning’ has
long been a frowned upon notion. It was substituted with the term ‘lan-
guage acquisition’ by researchers with a generativist agenda. In opposi-
tion to the empiricist tradition, they established new notions along with
a new linguistic paradigm — generative grammar. ‘Learning’ has not
only been largely banned from the linguistic literature but it has also
received less attention in cognitive psychology, due to the ‘‘cognitive rev-
olution’’ (Baars 1986) instigated by Chomsky (1957, 1959). One of the
consequences of this paradigmatic turn was that new information pro-
cessing models emphasized knowledge representation and de-emphasized
the learning process (Glaser 1990; Reber 1993: 4).
In this special issue, we take a fresh look at the old controversy in the
light of novel and challenging approaches which have arrived recently in
the field — implicit modes of learning, bootstrapping, optimality theory,
connectionism, usage-based and emergentist approaches, self-organizing
and dynamic systems. In this introductory paper we will set the scene for
the articles to come: In Section 1 we will start out with a clarification of
basic terms like development, learning, and acquisition.2 In Section 2
we will briefly recapitulate the various stages in the debate between ra-
tionalists and empiricists up to now. In Sections 3 and 4 more recent
approaches will be characterized before, in Section 5, the outline of the
special issue including the individual papers will be summarized.
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1. Development — learning — acquisition
Learning has often been discussed in relation to ‘development’ and to
acquisition. Of these three terms, development is the most neutral one,
embracing a whole range of scenarios, from the unfolding of a predeter-
mined genetic plan up to the active interaction of the organism with the
environment. In the psychological literature, the labels ‘development’
and ‘learning’ (Savelsbergh 2003)3 as well as ‘learning’ and ‘acquisition’
(van Geert 1986: 26–27; Reber 1993: 5) are often used interchangeably.
In most of the linguistic literature, however, ‘learning’ and ‘acquisition’
are seen as a dichotomy.
If ‘development’ and ‘learning’ are distinguished, as in van Geert (1986:
24), they are di¤erentiated in terms of intentionality. In ‘learning’, what
is learned is ‘‘viewed as the goal of intentional acts carried out by the
learner’’, whereas in ‘development’, ‘‘it is the nonintentional result
either of something that occurs to the subject, such as biological matura-
tion, or of intentional activities of the subject himself ’’. Since learning is
considered to be intentional, it is equated with ‘explicit learning’. How-
ever, this is only one type of learning: Another type is ‘implicit learning’
which has been the topic of more recent studies (Reber 1993; Stadler and
Frensch 1998; Cleeremans 1997; Cleeremans et al. 1998; see also Weinert
this issue, and Section 3.2). Implicit learning is considered to be uninten-
tional, is based on associative learning, and leads to tacit knowledge.
As for the relationship between learning and development, Elman
(2005) points out that a developmental theory that relies only on learning
does not capture the whole picture. ‘Maturation’, i.e. primarily endoge-
nous changes, has to be taken into account as well. Learning and matura-
tion interact in that learning is constrained to certain time windows in the
maturational processes (Elman et al. 1996). Changes from simple to
complex behavior (‘‘the scaling problem’’) can only be explained via de-
velopment. Complex behavior is the product of a causal chain of develop-
mental stages. ‘‘In other words, development may be Nature’s solution to
Figure 1. The relation of learning and development
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its own scaling problem.’’ (Elman 2005: 116). Figure 1 provides a rough
outline of the relationship between learning and development.
Thus a learning theory has to be embedded into a developmental
theory, which also includes maturation. Fig. 1 does not yet show the com-
plete picture. In order to fill in the blank spaces, let us turn to the rela-
tionship between learning and acquisition.
1.1. Language learning vs. language acquisition
From a semantic point of view, both expressions — ‘to learn something’
and ‘to acquire something’ — seem to indicate a process, yet the processes
di¤er with regard to the time span and the characteristics of the end state
involved: while learning implies a process without a prespecified, let alone
successful end state, acquisition, in contrast, presupposes that after a
short time the process comes to a successful end.4 Furthermore, in the
case of ‘to acquire’ the ‘acquired X’ seems to be or become an object,
compressed and not spaced out in time (cf. [1], [2]):
(1) He acquired/*learned a fortune/ shares of firm X/ the right to
vote/ a client/ competence in speaking language X.
(2) He acquires/ learns sign language.
All these properties of ‘acquisition’ characterize precisely the concept pro-
posed by generative approaches.
If the term ‘learning’ is used in the generative literature, then it is used
in a negative way as in the ‘learnability problem’ (Gold 1967; Wexler and
Culicover 1980), i.e., language cannot be learned. Therefore, it is claimed
that relevant mechanisms (learning algorithms) and linguistic categories
are part of children’s biological endowment (for more details see Eisenbeiß
this issue).
Given that acquisition and implicit learning imply a nonintentional
learner and lead to implicit/tacit knowledge, can ‘acquisition’ be identi-
fied with ‘implicit learning’? Krashen’s Acquisition-Learning Hypothesis
in second language acquisition (Krashen 1987, 1988) seems to identify
the two. According to him, second language learners may both acquire
and learn a language. ‘Learning’ is the conscious, e¤ortful study of the
forms of language. ‘Acquisition’ is the unconscious, intuitive picking up
of a language through meaningful interaction in the target language,
much like in first language acquisition. While both systems in themselves
are incommensurable, they can and should be combined, with acquisition
as the more important mechanism taking the lead and learning acting as
the monitor or editor of the planned utterance in the second language.
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However, ‘acquisition’ cannot readily be equated with implicit learning
from a generative perspective, since generativists deny associative learn-
ing as a core learning mechanism and instead claim that the learning
mechanism is triggering. Figure 2 summarizes the concepts and underly-
ing learning mechanisms discussed so far.
Note that in Figure 2, ‘acquisition’ has a twofold connection: it is
related to the concept of a ‘nonagentive learner’ under the branch of
‘exogenous source of change’ and to ‘maturation’ under the branch of
‘endogenous source of change’, reflecting the fact that ‘acquisition’ re-
quires exposition to the Primary Linguistic Data (henceforth PLD, i.e.,
positive evidence) on the one hand and, on the other hand, presupposes
a rich innate endowment which, for some researchers, means maturation
(Wexler 1999).
2. Historical background: two epistemological positions in combat
2.1. Empiricism vs. rationalism
The main controversy about language being learned or acquired has
evolved in waves of philosophical dispute between the empiricist and ra-
tionalist tradition (cf. also Jordan 2004; Russell 2004). This controversy is
also known as the ‘‘nurture-nature’’ debate (Elman et al. 1996; Tomasello
and Slobin 2004, among others).
The empiricist tradition started o¤ with Aristotle in the ancient world
and was revived in the Middle Ages by St. Thomas Aquinas. In the 17th
Figure 2. The relation between development, types of learning, acquisition, and maturation
with regard to language acquisition
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century it inspired empiricism and sensualism of Locke and Hume, who,
in turn, are considered the predecessors of behaviorism. Aristotle held
that physical objects were fully grasped through experience.5 The most
concise quote by which the doctrine of empiricism is captured comes
from St. Thomas Aquinas — ‘‘Nihil est in intellectu quod prius non fuerit
in sensu’’ [Nothing is in the intellect which was not first in the senses].
Locke coined the dictum that the infant’s mind is comparable to a tabula
rasa6 and is thus devoid of any innate ideas.
The rationalist tradition started out with Plato. In his dualist meta-
physics he held that our perceptual experiences allow only indirect access
to the ultimate real forms, namely the ideas and universals (compare his
famous ‘allegory of the cave’). This line of thinking was revived in Des-
cartes’ dualist thinking in the 16th century and by Leibniz’ proposal of
innate ideas (god, perfection, eternity) in the 17th century. Chomsky
(1981, 1986), as a contemporary representative of the rationalist tradition,
asks how a child can acquire so much sophisticated linguistic knowledge
in such a short time and without conceivable e¤ort, given only limited
and imperfect input. The answer to the ‘‘logical problem of language
acquisition’’ (Hornstein and Lightfoot 1981; Baker 1979), which is also
called ‘‘Plato’s problem,’’ lies in the assumption that knowledge of lan-
guage is innate.
2.2. Behaviorism and connectionism vs. generativism
At the beginning of the 20th century, learning theories became the domi-
nant paradigm in psychology, starting with Watson (1913, 1930) and
Thorndike (1913, 1932), and followed by Pavlov (1928) and Skinner
(1938). They claimed that all learning involves some very fundamental
and easy learning principles, namely classical, instrumental and operant
conditioning.7 In classical conditioning sensu Pavlov, an organism (e.g.,
a dog) learns through experience to associate an unconditioned stimulus
(UCS, e.g., a piece of meat) with a conditioned stimulus (e.g., a tone).
After repeated exposure to this contingency the UCS acquires the power
to elicit a conditioned response (CR, production of saliva) which is simi-
lar to the spontaneous unconditioned response (UCR) to the UCS. In
instrumental or operant conditioning sensu Skinner, the conditioned re-
sponse (e.g., pecking on a response lever) is emitted voluntarily by the
organism (e.g., a pigeon) which experiences some consequence of its be-
havior (reward or no reward). If the consequence is positive, the behavior
becomes reinforced; if the consequence is negative, the behavior becomes
extinct. Central to operant conditioning is the stimulus-response (S-R)
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connection formed by associative bonds. According to the ‘‘law of e¤ect’’
(Thorndike 1913), the strength of these bonds is contingent upon the con-
sequences: rewards strengthen the bonds, whereas lack of reward weakens
them.
In his Verbal Behavior, Skinner (1957) applied the learning mechanism
of operant conditioning to language, claiming that ‘‘verbal behavior is
similar to any other operant response, controlled by reinforcement and
punishment.’’ (Mowrer and Klein 2001: 13). Operant conditioning also
acquired explanatory force in functionalist approaches to language learn-
ing (Halliday 1975). Functionalists argued that in order to communicate
successfully with the environment and thus receive reinforcement for their
verbal behavior, children speak like their environmental models do. Fur-
thermore, contingencies and transitional probabilities between words may
account for word order and particular constructions and can be modeled
e.g., by Markov chains.
Following the criticism of Skinner’s Verbal Behavior (1957) by Chom-
sky (1959),8 behaviorism was renounced as a viable theoretic account of
language in particular and cognitive science in general. For language,
Chomsky argued that structure-dependency, syntactic transformations
and structural ambiguity could not possibly be learned by any general
problem-solving mechanism such as di¤erential reinforcement, associa-
tion, imitation, analogy or generalization (Piattelli-Palmarini 1989).
Rather, he invoked innate constraints on the format of possible human
languages, known as Universal Grammar (UG). UG makes available to
infants only a subset of languages, from which the proper choice is trig-
gered by a minimum amount of PLD.
Although Chomsky claims that structural properties of language are
not learned in one of the major generative language acquisition models,
the Principles and Parameters theory, there remains a ‘‘learning residue’’.
Atkinson locates this residue in the interaction of the open parameters
with perceptual experience and in the minimal induction process involved
in the formulation and testing of hypotheses concerning the parameter
(Atkinson 1986: 121 and 126).
In connectionism, as in behaviorism, learning also plays a pervasive
role. Connectionism is related to behaviorism in two aspects. Firstly,
experience — here the linguistic input — is the dominant factor in learn-
ing and secondly, association based on spatio-temporal contiguity, simi-
larity, and analogy is the underlying learning mechanism.9 The major
methodology of connectionism is simulation of various cognitive pro-
cesses in neural networks (Elman et al. 1996; Plunkett 2001, Westermann
et al. this issue, among others). Over the past twenty years, connectionist
models have developed from a simple 1:1 mapping from input to output
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to very sophisticated network architectures. The major improvements
came from the addition of hidden layers between input and output and
from recurrent connections (Elman et al. 1996; McLeod et al. 1998). The
current connectionist models are biologically inspired and can model crit-
ical periods or time windows in development and neural plasticity (Elman
et al. 1996). With regard to the history of science in the field, connection-
ist models (as well as other models proposing emergent structures, see be-
low) have taken up the challenge of falsifying claims which formed the
basis of the generative approach such as the ‘poverty of stimulus’ (see
Section 2.2).
The properties of current connectionist models can most easily be char-
acterized in contrast to the ‘‘classical metaphor of cognition’’ in symbolist
frameworks (Cleeremans 1997). As Bates and Elman (1992) argue, the
classical metaphor holds that
1. Representations are discrete.
2. Rules tend to be absolute.
3. Learning is viewed as programming or memorizing (in line with
the computer metaphor). New knowledge is due to hypothesis
testing.
4. There is a classical distinction between hard- and software (in line
with the computer metaphor).
The alternative view of connectionism, as reported by Cleeremans (1997),
holds that
1 0. Representations are more flexible due to processing of partial in-
formation and may thus be graded.
2 0. Organisms are sensitive to regularities and patterns in the input.
The postulation of absolute rules which either apply or fail to
apply is not necessary.
3 0. Learning is due to experience and happens continuously.
4 0. Instead of the classical distinction between hard- and software, the
machine and what it knows is basically the same.
Since experience plays a dominant role (see 3 0), language input is rehabili-
tated as a major source that drives language learning.
The debate between generative and connectionist approaches has led
to a diversification of approaches in both camps and to combinations
of ideas and methods from the two. Some approaches have claimed the
‘‘radical middle’’ (e.g., Hennon et al. 2000). Some are closer to one or
the other pole. Closer to the generative position are studies in the frame-
work of Optimality Theory (see Fikkert and de Hoop this issue) and
bootstrapping (see Ho¨hle this issue). Closer to the connectionist position
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are studies in the framework of usage-based (Tomasello 2000a, 2000b,
2003) and emergentist theories (MacWhinney 1999; see also Behrens this
issue). An integration of statistical learning with rule-governed behavior
is found in Marcus (2001) and with UG is found in Yang (2004).
2.3. Major issues in the current debate between generativism and
connectionism
The discussion between generativism and connectionism is one between
‘deductive and inductive models’ (Broeder and Murre 2000) and concerns
the ‘logical problem of language acquisition’ in particular the ‘‘poverty
of the stimulus’’ argument (Pullum and Scholz 2002; Pullum 2003), the
availability of negative or positive evidence and general constraints on
learning grammar (MacWhinney 2004).
Gold’s (1967) proof that nonfinite languages could not be learnt by
mere text presentation (only positive evidence) has been used by linguists
and philosophers as ‘‘a powerful argument for the existence of innate
knowledge of universal grammar that can assist in learning’’ (Pullum
2003). Gold proved that nonfinite grammars are not learnable without
negative evidence which helps learners to recover from incorrect overgen-
eralizations. Only through informant presentation (exposure to sentences
plus parental grammaticality judgments of the child’s speech) would
nonfinite languages become learnable (cf. Atkinson 1992; Pullum 2003).
Gold’s proof was supported by the unavailability of negative feedback.
It was found that (i) parents did not correct their o¤spring’s utterances
grammatically (at most its content) and (ii) children did not even make
use of repairs when they were provided. The only kind of negative evi-
dence that was available throughout the course of language acquisition
was indirect negative evidence. From absent structures in the input the
child can ‘‘deduce’’ that they are not part of the language to learn.
In the 1980s the focus in the generative debate shifted to the unavail-
ability of positive evidence in ‘error-free learning’ based on production
data. (MacWhinney 2004: 888–895). If it were true that children pro-
duced grammatical utterances with respect to some constructions without
any prior positive evidence, only nativism could yield a coherent explana-
tion (see Eisenbeiß this issue). The major arguments concerned structural
dependency, extraction from complex NPs, binding principles, etc. Yet,
MacWhinney (2004) argues that it has never been shown that this learn-
ing has taken place in the absence of positive evidence (p. 895).10
Pullum (2003) and Scholz and Pullum (2006) address another aspect of
Gold’s classical learnability proof, namely that the grammar has to be
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learned 100 percent (compare [2] in the list below). They propose that,
alternatively, ‘‘probably approximately correct’’ or ‘‘(PAC) learning’’
(Scholz and Pullum 2006: 70; cf. also Pullum 2003) may be invoked,
under which grammar learning is possible if the goal of explaining gram-
mar learning is weakened to less than 100 percent.
MacWhinney (2004) refutes the logical problem of language acquisi-
tion by proposing a mixture of seven solutions which, operating together,
‘‘support full and successful language learning’’ (pp. 897–909):
1. Limiting the class of grammars to those which are learnable on the
basis of positive data, namely finite state grammars.
2. Revising the end-state criterion of learning to probabilistic and not
absolute identification (see Pullum 2003).
3. Conservatism: A conservative learner will not overgenerate and
hence needs no corrective feedback.
4. Competition along with conservatism will strengthen correct repre-
sentations based on rote learning (e.g., went), against the pressure
to generate analogous forms (goed ).
5. Through cue construction the child generates features which block
overgeneralization.
6. By monitoring and correcting her own faulty output in the light of
the PLD the child converges on the correct form.
7. Indirect negative evidence.
Given these seven solutions, MacWhinney denies that recovery from
overgeneralizations is impossible. Thus, the ‘logical problem’ is obsolete.
Alternative mechanisms can account for language learning. They will be
described in the next section.
3. More recent concepts of learning
3.1. Distributional, statistical, or probabilistic learning
While in the literature ‘learning’ has always been accepted as the way to
build up vocabulary, it has only been in the last 15 years that researchers
have begun to explore children’s skills in detecting distributional, i.e.
basic statistical properties of the language to learn.
‘Distribution’ is the result of a ‘discovery procedure’ known since struc-
tural linguistics; i.e. the distribution of x is the occurrence of x in a partic-
ular linguistic unit (in a syllable, a word, a sentence or an utterance).
Most often x is seen in relation to the co-occurrence of y: while x may be
a phoneme, a syllable, a word etc., y may be another phoneme, the onset,
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nucleus or coda of a syllable, a word, a prosodic cue at the end of a
sentence, an object in the real world or the like. For instance, in English
the determiner the is positioned in front of a noun (or an attributive
adjectiveþ noun) and it is only observed with these constituents. Thus it
is possible for the learner to detect words that ‘‘go together’’. These word
groups then lead to larger constituents which in turn facilitate the finding
of a hierarchical structure. The determiner, moreover, allows for predic-
tion of which word class the next word belongs to (given x then y is to
be expected).11 In this way it is possible to look at the statistical prop-
erties of language and carry out probabilistic ‘reasoning’ in terms of co-
occurrences or covariation and in terms of hierarchical structure.
Statistical learning of this kind has been observed in young children
with regard to various domains: most often it is explored with regard to
the discovery of prosodic regularities (e.g., Jusczyk et al. 1993a, 1993b,
1994), to word segmentation with or without prosodic cues (e.g., Brent
and Cartwright 1996; Christiansen et al. 1998; Sa¤ran et al. 1996a; Aslin
et al. 1998; for adults Sa¤ran et al. 1996b), to word sequencing and hier-
archical structure (in children Gomez and Gerken 2000 and in adults
Sa¤ran 2001), to inflectional morphology like verb or noun paradigms
(e.g., Nakisa and Hahn 1996), word classes (Ho¨hle et al. 2004) and lexi-
cal semantics (e.g., Redington and Chater 1997). Statistical learning is
also involved in a number of processes summarized under ‘‘bootstrap-
ping’’ (cf. Ho¨hle this issue).
It has to be kept in mind that distributional learning is not limited to
auditory information; it is also relevant for visual information (Canfield
and Haith 1991) and for the learning of motor sequences (Hunt and Aslin
2001). Moreover, it is not restricted to human learners, as comparisons
of young children with cotton-top tamarin monkeys show (Ramus et al.
2000; Hauser et al. 2001). Thus this type of learning seems to be rather
basic, robust and neither species nor domain specific.
In a number of studies, such distributional cues have been analyzed
with regard to mutual support or competition (see Weinert this issue). A
very prominent psycholinguistic model based on such a view is the Com-
petition Model by Bates and MacWhinney (e.g. 1982, MacWhinney and
Bates 1989).12 In this model prosodic, morphosyntactic, semantic and/or
pragmatic cues compete with one another in sentence interpretation and
production. On this account the meaning of a sentence is the emergent
result of such competition.
Many studies about statistical learning of languages are concerned with
learning an artificial language (cf. for instance, studies by Sa¤ran and
Aslin and their collaborators or by Gomez and Gerken 2000). Language
learners — infants, children, and adults — are able to discover the under-
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lying regularities in the data without learning them explicitly (cf. Weinert
this issue). Thus Aslin et al. (1998) and others have also called this im-
plicit learning. Interestingly, researchers in this field tend to be quite care-
ful in the use of the term ‘rule’ (cf. Gomez and Gerken 2000). There is
an as yet unresolved dispute on the terminology and interpretation of
the very same phenomena. Connectionists would talk about patterns and
regularities (of varying complexity and abstraction) while generativists
would cling to the traditional notion of a rule as a symbolic object which
can be considered and manipulated consciously (cf. the discussion in
Marcus 1999; Marcus et al. 1999; Eimas 1999; Seidenberg and Elman
1999a, 1999b; McClelland and Plaut 1999).
Distributional analysis has been used by researchers who prefer a for-
mal theory (e.g. Marcus et al. 1999; Hauser et al. 2002; Yang 2004) as
well as by those who prefer a connectionist framework (Christiansen et
al. 1998; Nakisa and Hahn 1996; Redington and Chater 1997). For the
first group it is an addition to other methods and does not seem to con-
tradict concepts like modularity etc. For the second group it is the major
methodology for going about learning.13
3.2. Implicit learning
As mentioned before, Aslin, Sa¤ran, and colleagues call distributional/
statistical learning ‘implicit learning’, a concept which was first explored
by Reber (1967), in particular with regard to learning an artificial gram-
mar. Reber (1993) defines implicit learning as follows:
Implicit learning is the acquisition of knowledge that takes place largely independ-
ently of conscious attempts to learn and largely in the absence of explicit knowl-
edge about what was acquired. (Reber 1993: 5)
Reber (1993) combines classical learning theory (namely conditioning)
with modern cognitive psychology:
[ . . . ] the basic principles of cognitive induction and abstraction on the one hand
and conditioning and associative learning on the other share a common process
— the detection of covariation between events. (Reber 1993: 4)
In contrasting implicit and explicit learning systems, Reber holds that im-
plicit learning is the default learning mechanism. It is phylogenetically
older and therefore more robust and resilient than the more recent mech-
anism of explicit learning. Yet he suggests that implicit and explicit learn-
ing are not two totally separate ‘systems’, but that there are transitions
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between the two. For a discussion of the relationship between the two
based on empirical data from artificial grammar learning by children
and adults, see Weinert (this issue).
In the last ten years the defining features of ‘implicit learning’ have
received quite a bit of attention (e.g., Berry 1997; Stadler and Frensch
1998; Jime´nez 2003 and numerous papers in journals like Trends in
Cognitive Science): be it the number of learning systems to be assumed,
the role of symbolic rules, the nature of representations, or the degree of
consciousness. A summary of this debate including the suggested models
is impossible here. Yet one position, the one by Cleeremans, should be
mentioned, since it provides valuable criticism of the current discussions
about processing and representations and opens up new perspectives.
Cleeremans (1997: 196) argues that these discussions in the field of im-
plicit learning prevail since researchers are still tempted to think in terms
of a symbolist theory of cognition: that there is a processor that takes
‘knowledge’ from one module, processes it and sends it o¤ to another
module for further processing.
One reason why the classical concept cannot accommodate implicit
learning is that the processor and the representations are distinct; i.e., the
processor manipulates the representations so that the representations can
be the object of representations themselves.
This, so Cleeremans (1997), cannot hold for implicit learning. He de-
fines it as:
At a given time [i.e., a particular context], knowledge is implicit when it can influ-
ence processing without possessing in and of itself the properties that would en-
able it to be an object of representation. Implicit learning is the process by which
we acquire such knowledge.14 (Cleeremans 1997: 199)
Furthermore, so Cleeremans, the nature of these representations is not
suitable for representing implicit learning: the representations are consid-
ered to be static and available for outside inspection, this flexibility of ac-
cess being a defining feature of symbols. And they are compositional in
nature. In symbolic systems elementary constituents are concatenated.
Following van Gelder (1990) Cleeremans assumes (1997: 201) that ‘‘con-
catenation, by definition, preserves the tokens of complex expression’s
constituents and their relationships in the expression itself.’’ Thus, the ele-
ments in these representations ‘‘covary with the things they represent’’
(p. 201).
These properties of representations in symbolic systems — flexibility in
access and compositionality — are incongruent with the concept of repre-
senting implicit knowledge since such knowledge, although it influences
processing, seems to be unavailable to outside inspection (p. 203).
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Cleeremans (1997) discusses four principles which provide another
framework for thinking about implicit knowledge. In particular, these
four principles evade the tacit assumption of direct mapping between be-
havior and representation which is assumed in symbolic systems.
1. Sensitivity to some regularity does not imply that this regularity
is represented as a manipulable object of representation in the
learner’s mind; e.g. a child’s utterance that an adult would analyze
as a chunk (in her mature language system) may not be represented
as a chunk in the child’s language system.
2. Architectural modularity has been suggested to explain dissociations
in symbolic systems. Such a view presupposes independent modules.
Yet there is empirical evidence, in particular from experiments which
show that one variable may be selectively a¤ected, but not the other.
Thus modules are only functionally and not architecturally distinct
(cf. Plaut 1995; Farah 1994; Pulvermu¨ller 2001, 2005).
3. Experimental measures may not a¤ect just one variable or one par-
ticular process, but a number of other variables or processes. Thus
there may be no tasks that exclusively examine one process. This is
particularly pertinent to experiments about implicit learning where
one task concerns awareness, the other implicit learning (cf. e.g.,
Dunn and Kirsner 1988; Jime´nez et al. 1996).
4. The dichotomy of controlled and automatic processes does not
seem to hold. Rather, one has to consider a continuous dimension.
‘Abstraction’ or ‘awareness’ may in fact be graded and continuous
rather than discrete and dichotomous. (cf. the findings by Mac-
Leod and Dunbar 1988; Cohen et al. 1990).
These principles are most congruent with connectionist models. For
instance, learning is not driven by incremental memorization, but by
processing. There is no distinction between processing and learning. Nei-
ther is there a distinction between the processor and the building of repre-
sentations. ‘‘The machine and what it knows are one and the same.’’
(Cleeremans 1997: 199). Moreover, in connectionist models knowledge is
represented neither symbolically, as a manipulable object, nor composi-
tionally. Instead knowledge is conceptualized as patterns of activation
distributed over many processing elements. Because of this distributional
nature representations are not seen as compositional, i.e. concatenative.
Cleeremans compares implicit knowledge to linguistic presuppositions,
i.e., when we process a sentence like John paid the bill, we may assume
that John is in a restaurant, that he is male etc., but we may not be aware
of all of the presuppositions associated with this sentence. Yet knowledge
that we are not aware of comes to bear in processing this sentence.
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3.3. Neurophysiology of learning
3.3.1. The neurocognitive bases of learning. Progress in the understand-
ing of the neurocognitive and neurophysiological processes in the mature
brain of adults and the developing brain of infants and children increas-
ingly shapes our conceptualization of learning (Johnson 2005; Kuhl 2000,
2004). Neither a narrow localizationist nor a modular view of the brain
nor a mere associationist or holistic view can accommodate the complex
findings about the architectural and functional organization of the brain
(Pulvermu¨ller 1997: 25). A strict modular view (Fodor 1983), on the one
hand, claims that the brain is innately organized into modules with a spe-
cific architecture and specific computations which therefore process data
of a particular stimulus domain in a domain-specific way right from the
outset. A holistic view such as Hebb’s (1949), on the other hand, claims
that the brain is nothing but a huge associative memory machine which
builds up connections between neurons based on their pattern of co-
activation in the past (Pulvermu¨ller 1997: 26). Basically, everything
can be connected with everything else. Hebb’s concept of synaptic co-
activation in cell assemblies comes closest to the connectionist ideal of a
brain that becomes crafted by processing the structured information from
the outside.15
While, no doubt, there are specific areas that are involved in language
processing such as Broca’s and Wernicke’s area, the pars opercularis, and
further subcortical structures sustaining language (Brown and Hagoort
1999), it has been found that nonlinguistic areas are involved in language
processing as well. In a series of experiments, Pulvermu¨ller (2001, 2005)
has shown that in the processing of action words (such as kick, pick
and lick), specific motor areas (for the leg, arm and tongue) are co-
activated while in the processing of perceptual words the visual areas are
co-activated. The best way to conceive of these findings is by postulating
distributed ‘‘word webs’’ in which several areas of the brain — language,
motor, perception, etc. — are temporarily bound together in a neuronal
cell assembly and serve a particular function. The formation of specific
neuronal cell assemblies is the result of associative learning as defined by
Hebb.
The neurophysiological mechanisms underlying the formation of neu-
ronal cell assemblies have been specified by Singer and Gray (1995) and
by Pulvermu¨ller (1999, 2001), amongst others. This mechanism of tempo-
ral binding has been referred to as ‘‘self-organization’’ by Singer and
Gray since a higher level ‘‘order parameter’’ (the cell assembly) emerges
through the cooperative activity of many local units (the individual neu-
rons) in response to a stimulus. Self-organization refers to the shaping
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of the brain’s functionality through the interplay between broadly pre-
specified computations and a biasing architecture of brain areas on the
one hand and experiences the organism makes during ontogeny on the
other hand. In this respect, neuronal self-organization has become a
powerful dynamic concept which can capture the interaction ‘nature’
and ‘nurture’.
3.3.2. Developmental neuroscience of language. New methods such as
event-related potentials (ERP), magneto-encephalography (MEG), near-
infrared spectroscopy (NIRS) and functional magnetic resonance imag-
ing (fMRI) allow for the safe study of young children’s brains during
language tasks.
In a recent survey of ERP studies with infants and children, Friederici
(2005) states that young language learners have the same ERP compo-
nents as adults do. At two months they show a mismatch negativity
(MMN) in a phoneme discrimination task, at nine months a closure pos-
itive shift (CPS) at intonational phrase boundaries, by twelve months a
negativity (N 400) in a lexical semantic task, and by 32 months the two
markers of syntactic processing, an early left anterior negativity (ELAN)
and a positivity (P600). Thus there is continuity in the neurobiological
processing of language. Qualitatively, the ERP components are the
same, they di¤er only quantitatively in terms of temporal delay, strength,
and expansion. With magneto-encephalography (MEG), Imada et al.
(2006) found evidence for involvement of the left inferior temporal cortex
(Broca’s area) in the processing of syllables at around six months. With
NIRS, Pena et al. (2003) showed that neonates already process forward
speech in the left temporal regions, whereas no such dominance was
found in backwards speech or silence (for converging results from an
fMRI study, see Dehaene-Lambertz et al. 2002). The very early process-
ing of speech in the left hemisphere is also corroborated in an fMRI study
of Dehaene-Lambertz et al. (2006). In their study, three-month-old in-
fants, who listened to 2-s-long sentences repeatedly, manifested a charac-
teristic spatio-temporal activity band whose phase shifted systematically
across the temporal lobe bilaterally until it reached Broca’s area in the
left frontal region.
Does the early left-hemispheric dominance in the processing of lan-
guage in healthy infants prove that language is innately located in the
brain? Johnson (2005) abstains from interpreting development in terms
of a ‘‘causal epigenetic pathway’’ but suggests ‘‘a more probabilistic epi-
genetic view’’ in his ‘‘interactive specialization view’’ (Johnson 2005: 140–
141). In typical development, small variation in the architecture of a
particular brain area and/or an earlier timing of maturation biases this
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area to process stimuli from a particular stimulus domain slightly better
than other areas. For example, the left temporal lobe is slightly more apt
at processing rapidly changing acoustic information. Thus it is more
probable that this brain area will host language.
This view is compatible with nativist and empiricist approaches as long
as they are nonexclusive. It takes seriously the dynamic interplay between
genetic predispositions, early brain development, and the interaction with
the environment.
4. Dynamic Systems Theory
In the 1990s a new framework emerged: Dynamic(al) Systems Theory
(henceforth DST).16 Some conceive of DST as a novel paradigm (Beer
2000; van Gelder 1998) while others argue that DST goes together with
connectionism, the two having only di¤erent histories (Thelen and Bates
2003). Still others conceive of both as complementary (Smith and
Samuelson 2003; see Westermann et al. this issue). The fact that some
aspects of DST have been integrated by both nativism and connectionism
— a process which has led to some conceptual hybridization — reflects
the attractiveness of this novel concept.
DST has roots in very di¤erent domains — mathematics, chemistry,
meteorology, physics, biology, in particular motor systems, robotics,
philosophy — and comes under a variety of notions such as self-
organization, chaos theory, theory of fractals, nonlinear dynamic sys-
tems, dissipative systems, catastrophe theory and synergetics (see
Hohenberger 2002).
Van Gelder (1998: 621–622) characterizes a dynamic(al) approach as
follows:
1. Emphasis on change, not state.
2. Focus on the position of a state with respect to other states, not on
structure itself.
3. Structure is laid out temporally.
4. The timing of events is more important than the order of particular
events.
5. Dynamic systems operate in parallel, not serially.
6. Processes are ongoing rather than having a fixed beginning and end.
7. Coupling between the environment and the system.
8. Representations are not static but can be graded (cf. also Cleere-
mans and Jime´nez 2002).
9. Dynamic(al) systems are not necessarily representational.
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In general, a dynamic(al) system approach looks at the development of
variables in time (van Geert 1997). In nonlinear dynamical systems, input
and output are related in a nonlinear way, i.e. big changes in input may
engender small changes in output, and, most interestingly, small changes
in input may engender big changes in output. Most biological systems are
nonlinear dynamical systems. They have the capability to self-organize,
i.e., they become irreversibly more complex through the cooperative
activity of their subsystems. It is this latter property, emergence, through
which novel qualities can arise. Self-organization and emergence are
novel concepts which change our understanding of the cognitive and lan-
guage development in young children. Crucially, DST suspends Fodor’s
claim (1980) that nothing new may ever occur in development if it is
not innate. Note that nativism derived its attraction mainly through
the impossibility of explaining language development through other
mechanisms, in particular learning mechanisms (Reber 1993: 5). Self-
organization, however, is a powerful device for explaining exactly how,
without external or internal controller, macroscopic order arises through
local interaction of microscopic entities. A pertinent example is syntax as
an emergent property of the lexicon having surpassed a critical threshold
(Bates and Goodman 1999; Marchman and Bates 1994). In this special
issue, two contributions — Hockema and Smith as well as Hohenberger
and Peltzer-Karpf — present varieties of DST applied to the development
of language. The contribution by Westermann et al. shares a number of
assumptions with DST.
5. The purpose of this special issue
As the preceding sections have shown, the various new approaches to
language learning can no longer be strictly allocated to the two big para-
digms, empiricism and nativism (or generativism and connectionism).
Today we have to orientate ourselves in a much more diversified field
where various approaches overlap and hybrid models have emerged, as
between distributional learning and generative grammar in bootstrapping
approaches (see the contribution of Ho¨hle); between self-organization
and connectionist theory (as in biologically inspired connectionism; see
Elman et al. 1996 and the contributions of Hockema and Smith as well
as Westermann et al. in this issue); self-organization and generative gram-
mar (see the contribution of Hohenberger and Peltzer-Karpf ); between
connectionism and generative grammar, as in Optimality Theory (see the
contribution of Fikkert and de Hoop); or between usage-based ap-
proaches and connectionism (see the contribution of Behrens).
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Since ‘learning’ is widely used in the field, it is high time to clarify the
following questions:
– What are these concepts of learning?
– Where do they di¤er or converge?
– What are the implications?
and finally
– What is learning?
5.1. Headers
To facilitate comparison between the approaches for the reader, we estab-
lished the following headers as orientation for the contributors.
The underlying concept of learning
(e.g., What are the basic assumptions and presuppositions? In which
paradigm is the approach embedded?)
The application of this concept
(e.g., Has the concept been applied in the field of lexical learning, pho-
nology, morphology syntax etc. or in studies of L2 learning and multi-
lingualism?)
Speculations about the further development of concepts of language
learning
(e.g., Is there a possibility for convergence with or for divergence from
concepts form another approach? Which are/will be the major issues in
the future?)
Strengths and weaknesses / pros and cons of the concept
The application of this concept to atypical language development
(e.g., specific language impairment, Williams Syndrome?)
Language learning and language change
(e.g., How is language learning related to the evolution of language
phylogeny)?
5.2. Short summary of the individual papers
As demonstrated in Section 3 of this introduction, implicit learning is
highly relevant to the topic of language learning. Therefore we would
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like to start this special issue with a paper on implicit learning contrasted
with explicit learning.
Sabine Weinert discusses these two ways of learning based on findings
from experiments with miniature languages learned by children and
adults. She starts out with a brief characterization of implicit, noncon-
scious and automatic learning on the one hand and of explicit hypothesis
testing and problem solving on the other. She points out that both kinds
of learning are highly dependent on the structure of the input. One of her
recent findings is that in the implicit mode the participant succeeds in
learning more complex morphophonological regularities and word cate-
gories if and only if the input contains additional features which covary
with the word categories and rules. Furthermore, she finds that implicit
learning is modality specific. Correlated phonological cues but not visual
cues facilitate the learning of morphophonological regularities. In con-
trast, explicit learning seems to focus more on visual-conceptual cues. In
the last section, Weinert discusses the consequences of her findings for
current language acquisition theories. She concludes her paper with a dif-
ferentiated developmental view on the interrelationship between implicit
and explicit learning.
Sonja Eisenbeiß gives a survey of previous and current generative ap-
proaches to language learning focusing on core concepts such as men-
talism, representation, nativism, and modularity. In GG, language de-
velopment is conceptualized as a highly selective process which is better
called acquisition rather than learning. In her own feature-driven and
lexicalist structure-building approach, she argues that the child instanti-
ates grammatical features in accordance with universal restrictions on
dimensions (e.g., number) and form (e.g., binarity) and integrates these
features into lexical entries guided by the general cognitive principle of
specificity. These recent developments in GG towards minimizing the
role of domain-specific innate predispositions in favor of more general
domain-unspecific principles may facilitate an approximation between
GG and various other approaches to language learning which are repre-
sented in this special issue, in particular connectionist, situated and em-
bodied approaches.
Paula Fikkert and Helen de Hoop outline an optimality-theoretic
approach to language learning. In OT the learning task of children is to
find the correct constraint ranking in their native language as exemplified
by an optimal form or interpretation. It is widely assumed that initially
markedness constraints outrank faithfulness constraints so that children
start out with unmarked (and frequent) forms and only later become
more and more faithful to marked (and infrequent) forms too. While their
main focus lies on phonology (prosodic and segmental structure), the
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authors also discuss lexical, syntactic and semantic phenomena (content
of lexical representations, TNS/AGR, word order/animacy, indefinite
articles and pronouns). They consider perceptual as well as production
studies, arguing that it is the directionality of optimization — unidirec-
tional from form to meaning (hearer perspective) and from meaning to
form (speaker perspective) or bidirectional (taking into account both
perspectives) — that explains whether comprehension precedes produc-
tion or vice versa. Classical controversies on the nature of constraints
(universal, gradient, functional) as well as the source of constraints (in-
nate, learned, emergent) also exist in OT, reflecting its dual ancestry in
generative and connectionist accounts and its striving for a resolution.
Barbara Ho¨hle provides an overview of another group of approaches
that developed out of generative concepts about 20 years ago: bootstrap-
ping approaches. Researchers in this field are interested in identifying the
mechanisms that help the child to get into the language system. The term
to bootstrap a system or, abbreviated, to boot a system again originates
from computer terminology (see Section 2.1 above) and denotes the pro-
cess where an operator system is needed to load a more complex pro-
gram. In language acquisition, such a bootstrapping mechanism takes
cues from the input language or some knowledge previously established
about the language to be learned in order to acquire further knowledge
within the same domain or in a di¤erent domain. Yet the nature of these
mechanisms is conceptualized in di¤erent ways, as Ho¨hle shows. She re-
views the empirical evidence for a number of bootstrapping mechanisms.
In particular she focuses on prosodic bootstrapping. Since bootstrapping
has highly restricted functions because it serves to get the child started,
one of Ho¨hle’s conclusions is that these mechanisms can only be consid-
ered as part of a more comprehensive model of language learning, for
instance of a model of distributional learning or of a model based on
dynamic systems theory.
Distributional learning is also the basic type of learning for the next
four groups of approaches in this special issue: the usage-based or emer-
gentist approaches, the connectionist approaches, as well as two kinds of
dynamic system approaches. Moreover, all of them share the assumptions
that new structures emerge from more simple structures or via reorgani-
zation and that linguistic knowledge emerges from the child’s interaction
with the ambient language.
Heike Behrens reviews usage-based and emergentist approaches to lan-
guage learning which have become prominent in the last 15 years. They
state that language can be learned from language use by means of social
skills like intention reading and a powerful generalization mechanism.
Usage-based approaches go back to assumptions and findings from Cog-
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nitive Linguistics, in particular they share the view that a speaker’s lin-
guistic system develops as a generalization over concrete usage events.
All linguistic units are seen as form-function pairings in that there is no
di¤erence in importance between formal or semantic-pragmatic factors
as driving forces for language learning. With growing experience, en-
trenchment leads to the automatization of frequent routines on the one
hand. On the other hand, the child compares utterances to one another,
finds similarities and dissimilarities, and thus categorizes the input and
forms increasingly abstract linguistics The generalization mechanism for
language-specific as well as for more general patterns (rule-like behavior)
is assumed to be the same. This property as well as the concept that chil-
dren ‘‘start small’’ and make use of learning mechanisms that are attested
in other domains also links the usage-based and emergentist approaches
to connectionist approaches and dynamic systems theories.
Connectionist approaches to language learning are discussed by Gert
Westermann, Nicolas Ruh, and Kim Plunkett. Learning in this frame-
work is considered in terms of adapting weights of connections within a
network. Since knowledge is encoded in the strengths of the connections
there is no separation between knowledge and memory. Input, of course,
plays a decisive role. Connectionist models allow for testing of hypotheses
via simulation. The authors review a number of models that have been
constructed to examine findings and hypotheses from babbling to learn-
ing syntax. The advantage of these models is that, on the one hand, these
simulations allow for a high degree of specificity in testing a particular
theory and that, on the other hand, the child’s input and environment
can be studied in great detail. The authors point out similarities and dif-
ferences to related approaches, like Baysian inference and the dynamic(al)
system theory. Whether or not the di¤erences between connectionism and
DST are of a principled nature is left to future research.
This special issue comprises two dynamic systems approaches to lan-
guage learning. The first one by Stephen Hockema and Linda Smith ex-
plores language learning from two directions: inside-out and outside-in.
The authors review how children extract phonological, lexical, semantic
and syntactic knowledge from multiple statistical and distributional re-
gularities, including internal resources (perceptual, cognitive, develop-
mental) and external ones (social, contextual, bodily, spatial). In the do-
main of word learning, the authors show how the child works through
successive levels of higher-order generalizations, learning about words
as they learn. The dynamic systems approach applied to language evo-
lution leads to the view that individual languages lie on multiple tra-
jectories across the language space rather than being prespecified final
states. Hockema and Smith especially emphasize the unique role of the
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body as the interface between the internal mental life and the external
world.
In the second dynamic systems approach, Annette Hohenberger and
Annemarie Peltzer-Karpf give an account of language learning against
the background of developmental neuroscience. While linguistic disposi-
tions (domain-specific and domain-general) are broadly genetically
predetermined, selection and modularization result from the interplay
with language experience, in accordance with principles of neural self-
organization. Hence, self-organization plays a mediating role between
nature and nurture. Central concepts in their approach are neural and
cognitive language growth, emergence of structural representations, as
well as synergy of microscopic local processes leading to macroscopic
global change. Evidence for their dynamical approach comes from a
chaotic itinerary to language with phases of stability and intermittent
turbulence which the authors trace in the areas of lexical, morphologi-
cal, and syntactic development in first- and second-language learners.
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Notes
1. We thank Heike Behrens, Barbara Ho¨hle, Wolfgang Klein, and Sabine Weinert for
their helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper. Maura Bresnan-Enders
kindly corrected our English. Correspondence address: Katrin Lindner, Germanistische
Linguistik, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universita¨t Mu¨nchen, Schellingstr. 3, 80799 Mu¨n-
chen, Germany. E-mail: katrin.lindner@germanistik.uni-muenchen.de.
2. We will not be able to summarize all the theoretical distinctions common in develop-
mental psychology, so the interested reader is therefore referred to Goswami (2002).
However, this introductory paper is still written from a more (psycho-) linguistic stance
and thus attempts to summarize the discussions in this field rather than in developmen-
tal psychology. For ease of reading, concepts are indicated with single quotation marks
only when they are first discussed.
3. In terms of concepts however, as Sabine Weinert (personal communication) pointed
out to us, development and ‘learning’ have been kept distinct. In a more narrow defini-
tion of development only universal, species-specific and directed change is included.
This narrow concept, however, has been modified in the developmental psychology of
life spans (cf. also Oerter and Montada 2002).
4. Compare the following sentences:
(i) He did not acquire/ never acquired the language.
He did not learn/ never learned the language.
(ii) He is *acquiring/ learning a language.
(iii) He acquired the language within a week/ ?? within four years/ *for three years
but never felt he could speak it.
He learned the language within a week/ within four years/ for three years but
never felt he could speak it.
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5. However, being a student of Plato, Aristotle maintained that sensual data has to be
worked upon by the rational mind (through language and logic) in order to gain form
and conceptual coherence. In this respect Aristotle was also a rationalist. Yet empiri-
cists usually consider him their ancestor.
6. A loose translation of tabula rasa is the ‘blank slate’ as (Pinker 2002: 5) calls it. In his
book with the identical title Pinker criticizes this concept which gave rise to another
wave of discussion in the nature-nurture literature.
7. For further details compare the discussion in Mowrer and Klein (2001).
8. In the preface to a reprint of the review Chomsky (1967: 142f ) states that he intended
the review not specifically as a criticism of Skinner’s approach to language but rather
as a more general critique of behaviorists’ assumptions on higher mental processes.
Critical responses to Chomksy’s review are extremely rare. For detailed criticism see
MacCorquodale (1970). For a critical review of Chomsky’s positions up to 1980 from
a behaviorist perspective cf. Palmer ([1981] 2000, 2000). We thank Wolfgang Klein for
pointing this reference out to us.
9. According to Gentner (2003) these underlying learning mechanisms are the reason
‘‘why we’re so smart’’.
10. Error-free learning, if it exists at all, is most likely to occur with universal principles
such as structural dependency. Parameterized dimensions such as binding, pro-drop,
government direction, etc. are likely to exhibit at least a certain amount of error given
their dependency on the PLD that the child has to scrutinize for relevant clues for the
parameter. MacWhinney (2004: 895) argues that a cascade of parametric decisions
is sometimes tantamount to a learning account. In this case, learning and parameter-
setting become indistinguishable. See also Atkinson’s (1986) ‘‘learning residue’’ in the
Principles and Parameters approach (Section 2.2).
11. Cf. also the calculations of transitional probability in Aslin et al. (1998: 321).
12. Within this framework a wide range of cross-linguistic comparisons have been made
(compare for instance the papers in MacWhinney and Bates 1989) which show that
learners solve the competition in language-specific ways. This model has also been
applied successfully to data of late talkers (Thal and Flores 2001) and children with
SLI (Evans and MacWhinney 1999, Lindner 2003).
13. Yet it may not be the only solution. Gentner (2003) and Tomasello (2003), for instance,
also rely on analogy.
14. Along with Searle (1992) Cleeremans (1997: 199) holds that all knowledge learners pos-
sess is at least ‘‘potentially accessible to consciousness’’. Therefore implicit knowledge
may be so at some particular time or in some specific context.
15. In the meantime a number of other concepts have been proposed. For instance, follow-
ing Callebaut (2005) modules may interact in constrained ways, yet they are assumed
to be functional (and possibly also physical) units unto themselves.
16. In the literature both adjectives, dynamic and dynamical are variably used. We there-
fore use the ‘‘mixed’’ terminology dynamic(al).
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